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Abstract: Innovation is a process that faces several market failure situations. For this reason and for being considered one of 
the main drivers of economic growth, a large number of governmental and supranational policies are designed to foster techno-
logical progress. Along with these policies, there is an increasing concern with their continuous evaluation aiming at providing 
valuable feedback for these program’s adaptation and adequacy to the firm’s needs. The paper develops an evaluation of the 
influence of innovation-focused programs in firm´s innovation and economic performance by means of a comparative analysis 
of the results obtained by Spanish firms that have participated in R&D national programmes and those achieved by Spanish 
firms participating in EUREKA international program. Findings show that the programmes were effective in achieving their ob-
jective of promoting technological innovation but, as regards the economic effects, the results were less conclusive since some 
differences were observed depending on the programme. The EUREKA companies displayed better behaviour, with positive 
differences in their returns on assets and labour productivity. The results also confirm the importance of designing more detailed 
and rigorous evaluation processes, taking into account the risk variable, in order to draw a more realistic picture of the impact of 
national and international programmes.
Keywords: Innovation, technology policy, technological cooperation, internationalisation, Eureka
Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es contribuir al conocimiento del impacto que tiene en las empresas su participación en 
programas públicos de apoyo a la innovación tecnológica, introduciendo como importante novedad el análisis comparado de los 
resultados obtenidos por las empresas españolas que han participado en programas de I+D de ámbito nacional (proyectos em-
presariales de I+D gestionados por el CDTI) frente a las que lo han hecho en programas internacionales (programa EUREKA). 
Los resultados muestran que ambos programas son eficaces en el logro de su objetivo de promover la innovación tecnológica, 
pero, en cuanto a sus efectos económicos, los resultados son menos concluyentes.
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Arrow (1962), it is generally 
accepted that the market is unable to efficiently allocate 
the resources necessary for research and innovation 
activities because knowledge-related activities have 
characteristics commonly ascribed to public goods. 
Thus, the absence of public intervention to compen-
sate for this situation would lead to underinvestment in 
socially activities which are desirable to achieve tech-
nological progress (Martin and Scott, 2000; Hall, 2002; 
Bönte, 2004).
There has been a proliferation of policies designed to 
stimulate business research, development and innova-
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analysis of the results obtained by Spanish firms that 
have participated in national programmes (R&D pro-
jects managed by the Centre for Industrial Technologi-
cal Development –CDTI) and those achieved by Span-
ish firms participating in international programmes (the 
EUREKA programme). Knowledge of the advantages 
and disadvantages of both experiences – R&D support 
at national level and individual programs versus col-
laborative collaboration in international environments 
- can help improve the design and implementation of 
different tools for public intervention in the field of in-
novation.
2. Background and Framework
After analysing whether it is appropriate to develop pol-
icies to help improve the allocation of public resources 
for technological innovation, research conducted on 
this topic has focused primarily on promoting public in-
terventions that take into account the wide variety of 
forms of innovation, the wide range of factors involved 
and the importance of interaction between companies 
and the international environment in innovation pro-
cesses (Nelson, 2007; Pianta and Varona, 2009).. In 
general, there has been a shift from actions aimed prin-
cipally at boosting traditionally conceived research and 
development towards actions that strive to enhance the 
visibility of the different potential forms of innovation, 
emphasizing interaction in what has become known 
as the “knowledge triangle” and encompassing all the 
above in a systematic vision of how innovation works, 
which requires new approaches in the design of pol-
icies to promote innovation (Ebersberger et al, 2008; 
Dodgson et al, 2011).
In terms of innovation policy, special attention must be 
drawn to three areas that have been studied extensive-
ly, the results of which frame this research paper: the 
first and more general problem, involves the relation-
ship between technological innovation and economy; 
the second is the study of the overall impact these pol-
icies may also have on innovation activities; and the 
third relates to the evaluation of programmes or poli-
cies, in terms of both their performance and impact on 
firms participating in such programmes.
In relation to the first area, numerous studies have been 
carried out to gauge the returns from R&D activities 
to the economy, while others have focused more on 
the relationships between innovation and productivity 
(Crepon et al, 1998; Wieser, 2005; Castellacci, 2008). 
In general terms, R&D or innovation activities, clearly 
yield positive returns, but the magnitude of the effect 
varies and is not always significant (Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000; Hall et al, 2011; Hall, 2011). However, the 
tion in all countries, irrespective of the political focus of 
their governments. However, this proliferation has not 
always been based on sufficient evidence that such 
policies may actually improve the behaviour and per-
formance of companies in the area of innovation (Díez, 
2001). In other words, market failures are a necessary 
but insufficient condition to justify the allocation of public 
funds to innovation support that may be used for other 
purposes; such allocation could only be justified if it is 
empirically confirmed that public programmes improve 
the innovation activities and thus the economic perfor-
mance of firms (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2010).
This suggests the importance of conducting rigorous 
evaluations of programmes designed to support tech-
nological innovation, especially if two characteristic fea-
tures of innovation policies are considered. Firstly, the 
actual complexity of innovation itself makes the search 
for simple cause-effect relationships between the ob-
jectives of specific programmes and their outcomes 
increasingly redundant (Arnold, 2004): an example of 
the possible contradiction is that a percentage of the 
success of a given action may be due to its relatively 
unambitious goals (Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al, 2008).
Secondly, the increasing variety and complexity of 
these policies complicates their evaluation due to the 
difficulty of designing appropriate analysis tools. This 
particularly affects international programs due to the 
difficulty involved in defining the contextual conditions 
that have to be taken into account and the behaviour 
of the project teams (Gilbert et al, 2004; Ebersberger 
et al, 2008). Although this is important, it is even more 
important in the case of economies which, like the 
Spanish economy, are characterized by a clear delay 
between efforts and the results of technological inno-
vation (Molero, 2011; Eurostat, 2012).
In recent decades, international policies adopted to 
support technological innovation have introduced an 
even more complex element, since it is unclear wheth-
er such policies provide improved or even different 
levels of efficiency than do national policies. In this re-
spect, attention must be drawn to the growing Euro-
pean dimension of important technological innovation 
policy initiatives, in particular the launch in 1985 of the 
EUREKA Programme, which is oriented more directly 
towards market activities than alternative initiatives in 
other European policies, notably the R&D Framework 
Programmes which have a pre-defined thematic struc-
ture.
The aim of this article is therefore to contribute to our 
knowledge of the impact on firms of their participation 
in public programmes to support technological innova-
tion, introducing one important novelty, a comparative 
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relationship is influenced by different factors: some au-
thors suggest that investment in knowledge may be a 
necessary but insufficient condition to produce results, 
and specifically highlight the existence of “venture cap-
ital” (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008) or, more generally, 
the relationships between technological and social or 
institutional capacities (Fagerber and Srcholec, 2008). 
Some researchers have also considered the diminish-
ing returns on R&D spending, which might be respon-
sible for the phenomenon known as the “Nordic par-
adox”: the apparent contradiction whereby countries 
which invest strongly in R&D seem only to achieve 
medium levels of growth in productivity (Lang, 2009).
The second area, which is more directly related to the 
subject of this paper, involves neoclassical studies that 
examine the relationship between the policies and in-
novation activities of firms, based on a market’s fail-
ure to allocate resources to innovation (Dodgson et al, 
2011). Numerous studies have focused on the impact 
of incentives for private R&D and resources allocated 
by companies, but these studies have not examined 
any specific policy or programme in depth. The aim of 
these studies was to determine whether an addition-
al positive impact was achieved whereby such incen-
tives prompted companies to allocate more resources, 
or whether this had some type of substitution effect, 
i.e. companies offset the allocation of more public re-
sources with lower contributions of their own capital. 
Although this type of additionality effect has been most 
commonly studied, other types of additionality can be 
identified, for example the obtainment of more patents 
or more new products and processes (the results of 
innovation) or the achievement of better economic re-
sults by companies.
In terms of incentives to encourage firms to engage in 
R&D activities, the two most commonly analysed in-
centives are direct aid and tax incentives. In the case 
of direct aid many studies have been published which 
coincide in finding that there is a positive additionality 
of resources that favours firms who allocate resources 
to R&D (Arvanitis et al, 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 
2003; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003; Duguet, 
2004; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; 
González and Pazo, 2010), although the magnitude of 
the effect is open to debate and sometimes the effect is 
actually the substitution of private resources by public 
resources. Abundant research has also been conduct-
ed on the impact tax incentives have on the R&D activ-
ities of firms and the findings are similar: tax incentives 
have a positive influence on the R&D activity of firms, 
in terms of either the decision to start such activity or 
to step up existing efforts (David et al, 2000; Wallsten, 
2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Marra, 2004, 2006). 
There are some discrepancies in results in terms of the 
type and magnitude of the effects studied, but in the 
case of Spain, the existing literature is relatively con-
sistent (Buson et al, 2010; González and Pazo, 2010).
The third area of interest is the study of the evalua-
tion of specific policies or programmes designed to 
support technological innovation. This evaluation be-
comes more necessary as it recognizes the “trial and 
error” nature of many policies that need feedback from 
evaluations in order to refine their approaches and in-
struments (Metcalfe and Georghiu, 1997). In spite of 
this, research in this area is hardly encouraging (Kette 
et al, 2000); hence, further evaluations are required in 
order to acquire objective information on the results of 
technological innovation policies and obtain feedback 
on policy design, the analysis of results and the rede-
signing of these policies, taking into account on-going 
institutional changes (Georghiou, 1997; Nelson, 2007). 
However, a distinction must be made between studies 
that focus on analysing the rationality of programmes 
or their terms of governance and execution (Cimolli et 
al, 2006) from others, such as those examined here, 
which focus on measuring the specific results of firms 
that have participated in such programmes.
EUREKA Programme
EUREKA was founded in 1985 to challenge the in-
creasing migration of R&D and industrial innovation to 
Asian and North-American countries. Its aim is to pro-
mote international, market-oriented research and inno-
vation through the support to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, large industry, universities and research 
institutes. Through EUREKA, these organisations are 
introducing new products, processes and services to 
market, helping make Europe economically strong and 
socially sound. Financing is variable and decisions 
about supporting participants depend solely on each 
country.
EUREKA currently consists of 38 member countries 
with a wide European geographical spread. After 25 
years, 1.300 projects have been completed, with a total 
value of over €14 billion. Two-thirds of the participants 
are firms and 40% are small and medium enterprises. 
The EUREKA mechanism, with its flexibility and lack 
of bureaucracy, closely matches the requirements of 
European industry (Georghiou, 1998).
EUREKA carries out its own evaluation system through 
periodic reviews. In the period 1992-1993 Eureka had 
its first major evaluation, involving teams from 14 coun-
tries working together and carrying out a survey of all 
the participants (Georghiou and Roessner, 2000). Ac-
cording to Luukkonen (2002), this evaluation influenced 
evaluation traditions in Europe. However, as well as its 
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internal evaluations, EUREKA has been the focus of 
several analyses:
• Fölster (1995) hypothesizes that given that EURE-
KA projects require cooperation but do not require 
result-sharing agreements, the likelihood of coop-
eration is lower.
• Barañano (1995) suggests that Spanish EUREKA 
participants see the improvement of the organiza-
tion’s public image as one of the most important 
features of the programme.
• Georghiou (2001) points out that EUREKA began 
with major projects but there was then a decline as 
a result of its divergence with national innovation 
policies.
• Marín and Siotis (2008) suggest that EUREKA 
serves the purpose for which it was designed, 
namely to correct the market failures associat-
ed with the generation of economically valuable 
knowledge.
• Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco (2010) demon-
strate that participation in a EUREKA project has 
a positive effect on a firm’s performance in both 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, 
which is in accordance with results from Benfratel-
lo and Sembenelli (2002) which also highlight an 
increase in labour productivity and price-cost mar-
gins for participants. They also find that there is a 
one year lag between project completion and per-
formance improvements.
But it is important to take into account the fact that 
even though the results presented are mainly positive, 
continuous assessments and even different research 
might not only identify weaknesses of the programme, 
but also provide the information necessary for adapta-
tions and changes in the initiative’s characteristics.
CDTI Projects
The CDTI (Centre for Industrial Technological Develop-
ment) is a public entity that promotes research, devel-
opment and technological innovation Spain. It strives to 
enhance the competitiveness of Spanish companies, 
improving their technological level by evaluating and 
funding research, development and technological inno-
vation projects.
The main features of these R&D projects are that they 
seek to develop new industrial processes or products, 
are applied research projects and are based on the de-
velopment of new technologies in companies.
Few studies have attempted to evaluate the effective-
ness of R&D projects financed by the CDTI. However, 
some have focused on this objective, notably the study 
by Molero and Buesa (1997), who presented the results 
of a survey on technological innovation in 1354 Span-
ish companies participating in these types of projects in 
the period 1984- 1995. The study analysed data about 
the international activity of these companies, their com-
petitive position, the resources they allocated to inno-
vation and the organisation of the technology creation 
process, their results and how these were achieved. 
Molero and Buesa (1998), based on the same survey, 
analysed effects of the company projects financed by 
CDTI and attempted to measure the importance of fi-
nancial support for Spanish industrial companies. Bu-
som (2000) used data about companies that received 
CDTI aid in 1988 and compared its impact with data 
from other innovative companies that did not receive 
such support. The author reported that public support 
generally boosted private initiatives and small firms 
were better able to participate in programmes. Lastly, 
Huergo and Trenado (2008) analysed the key factors 
that determine the likelihood of companies applying for 
soft loans from the CDTI to finance their R&D projects 
and this agency’s decisions and selection of beneficiar-
ies of such loans. These factors focus on the compa-
ny’s ability to carry out research (budget, technical de-
velopment capacity, degree of innovation of the project 
and the potential for exploiting and marketing results).
3. Methodology and Variables
The analysis was carried out using two databases 
provided by the CDTI containing information on all the 
companies in both groups: one containing the data of 
Spanish firms participating in the EUREKA programme 
in 2000-2006 (EUREKA companies),and another con-
taining the data of Spanish firms participating in CDTI 
projects in the same period (CDTI companies). 264 
firms participated in EUREKA programme and 2,888 
companies in CDTI projects.
In terms of size, an initial descriptive analysis revealed 
that most companies were small and medium-sized 
enterprises and its percentage was higher among the 
CDTI companies (85%) than the EUREKA firms (73%). 
In terms of sectoral distribution, industrial companies 
accounted for the largest percentage in both groups 
and were particularly high among CDTI companies 
(63%). The percentage of service sector companies is 
larger in the EUREKA (42%) than in the CDTI group 
(33%), and in both groups primary sector companies 
accounted for a very small percentage of the total (Fig-
ure 1).
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Figure 1. Sample distribution
The variables used in the analysis were grouped into 
two specific areas: economic variables and variables 
relating to the technological innovation capacity of the 
firm. The economic variables were total assets, sales, 
number of employees and added value. The techno-
logical variables were total R&D expenditure, spending 
on patent applications and spending on computer soft-
ware. The analysis period was 1998-2008, three years 
before and three years after the companies participat-
ed in the corresponding projects.
The data for carrying out the analyses was obtained 
from the SABI database (Iberian Balance Sheets Anal-
ysis System). Economic and technological information 
was extracted from this database for 235 of the 264 
EUREKA companies and 2,650 of the 2,888 compa-
nies that participated in CDTI projects. The firms that 
participated in both programmes were not taking into 
account.
This information was used to develop five indicators 
(two economic and three technological) for these com-
panies:
• Economic indicators: return on assets (ROA), de-
fined as earnings before taxes divided by total as-
sets, and labour productivity (LP), measured as 
added value for employment.
• Technological indicators: weight of R&D on add-
ed value (R&D/AV), weight of patent applications 
on added value (PAT/AV) and software on added 
value (AI/AV). The latter indicator brought anoth-
er perspective to the impact analysis, namely the 
impact of participation in aid programmes on the 
incorporation of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in companies. This aspect is 
particularly important for Spanish firms given the 
relative delay of the Spanish economy in the use 
of ICT in the production and management of firms. 
In order to compare the results of firms before and af-
ter their participation in the corresponding programme, 
two statistical tests were performed for related sam-
ples: a parametric test (t in differences), and a non-par-
ametric test (Wilcoxon test), comparing the situation of 
companies before the completion of the projects (up to 
three years before) with the results obtained after their 
completion (up to three years later). 
Parametric tests assume a normal distribution and if 
this assumption is not rejected, these tests are deemed 
to be more robust than non-parametric tests (Hair et 
al, 2010). Given the large number of observations for 
each variable, it was possible to accept this assump-
tion (central limit theorem). However, a non-parametric 
test was also conducted and, although less robust, it 
was not based on any specific distribution assumption. 
The results for the EUREKA and CDTI companies in 
both tests yielded very similar conclusions.
The analysis allowed to identify the indicators in which 
significant differences were observed in the behaviour 
of companies after their participation in the different 
programmes. In addition to the analysis of companies 
as a whole, other comparisons were made differentiat-
ing by size and sector of activity.
4. Main Results
Descriptive Analysis 
An initial descriptive analysis of the variables in the 
year of project completion revealed that the EUREKA 
companies displayed higher average returns on assets 
(ROA) and expenditure on patent applications and soft-
ware than the CDTI firms. However, these companies 
presented higher labour productivity, while R&D effort 
was very similar in both groups (Table 1).
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The analysis by company size showed that EUREKA 
companies (both large firms and SMEs) achieved high-
er returns on assets (ROA) than CDTI companies, and 
these returns were particularly high in large EUREKA 
companies (with a value of 9.36). The same trend was 
observed in the expenditure on patent applications and 
software variables, irrespective of company size. In 
contrast, labour productivity was greater in CDTI com-
panies, while the impact of R&D expenditure depended 
on company size; the impact was greater in large EU-
REKA companies and CDTI SMEs, the highest value 
being observed in smaller companies (Table 2).
Table 2. Descriptive analysis (firms by size)
ROA PL R&D/AV PAT/AV AI/AV
Large  
Companies
EUREKA Mean 9.36 4.74 26.49 3.51 4.06
Standard 
dev.
12.52 2.93 20.18 6.91 4.31
CDTI Mean 2.33 5.91 15.44 0.98 3.20
Standard 
dev.
12.21 11.28 19.63 1.55 3.62
SMEs EUREKA Mean 3.08 4.73 35.07 8.39 8.81
Standard 
dev.
14.78 3.25 47.06 31.61 21.29
CDTI Mean 1.47 5.63 37.30 2.31 3.83
Standard 
dev.
16.25 6.16 43.33 6.96 4.54
Table 1. Descriptive analysis (total firms) 
ROA PL R&D/AV PAT/AV AI/AV
EUREKA Mean 4.73 4.73 32.05 6.80 7.30
S t a n d a r d 
dev.
14.46 3.16 39.60 26.19 17.82
CDTI Mean 1.64 5.68 32.53 2.08 3.68
S t a n d a r d 
dev.
15.54 7.43 27.15 6.36 4.33
Finally, the analysis by sector of activity revealed that 
the main differences between the two groups appeared 
in primary sector companies in relation to returns on 
assets (ROA) and software expenditure, with EUREKA 
companies presenting higher values. CDTI companies 
presented much higher values in terms of R&D effort. 
In the industrial sector, the main difference observed 
was the high ROA of EUREKA companies.
 Finally, EUREKA service sector companies present-
ed much higher average expenditure on software than 
CDTI firms (Table 3).
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Statistical Analysis
As explained, the aim of the statistical analysis is to 
determine whether significant differences in economic 
and technological aspects were observed in the com-
panies after the completion of their projects. The time 
elapsing until the impacts were noticeable was also 
analysed comparing the existing situation three years 
before the end of the project with that after three years 
of the project completion (it was expected that if the 
programmes had an impact on business performance, 
these results would not be immediate). Tables 4 to 9 
show the results statistically significant at the 10% level 
in both parametric and non-parametric tests.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the differ-
ence-in-means test on the technological and economic 
indicators for all firms participating in both programmes. 
The binomial indicates the time when a significant dif-
ference was observed, where i was the project com-
pletion year, and the negative or positive numbers the 
years before or after the completion of the project. For 
example, the binomial (i-1, i+1) would indicate the ob-
servation of a significant difference between the values 
of the analysed variable one year before and one year 
after the completion of the project.
It was generally observed that after the completion of 
the projects, the differences in technological results 
were more significant in the CDTI companies than in 
the EUREKA companies (Table 4). In terms of R&D 
effort, the effects were observed in both programmes 
in the year of completion of the project, but sooner in 
EUREKA companies (significant difference within two 
years ago) than in CDTI companies, where the impact 
was observed within three years. As regards the other 
technological variables, in patent applications signifi-
cant differences were only observed in CDTI compa-
nies and the effect on patents was not observed until 
two years after completion of the project, which is con-
sistent with the time required to develop and publish 
patents. Significant differences were observed regard-
ing the impact on software in the year of completion 
of the project in CDTI firms. In other words, the most 
Table 3. Descriptive analysis (firms by sector)
ROA PL R&D/AV PAT/AV AI/AV
Primary
sector
EUREKA Mean 6.02 4.48 1.74 1.73 7.12
Standard 
dev.
7.11 4.03 2.06 3.40 9.10
CDTI Mean 1.53 5.22 15.25 1.03 1.06
Standard 
dev.
1.11 4.33 23.25 0.90 0.65
Industrial
sector
EUREKA Mean 7.34 5.35 31.41 3.58 3.63
Standard 
dev.
12.04 2.73 26.02 6.15 3.23
CDTI Mean 1.14 5.81 32.63 2.22 3.78
Standard 
dev.
17.12 8.72 137.67 6.99 4.52
S e r v i c e 
sector
EUREKA Mean 1.12 4.12 39.09 1.33 9.51
Standard 
dev.
7.53 3.40 61.97 1.83 9.23
CDTI Mean 2.40 5.37 39.79 1.78 3.47
Standard 
dev.
11.98 4.37 51.01 2.81 3.65
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immediate effect was observed in relation to the intro-
duction of ICT as a sign of modernisation, while results 
in other technological areas were obtained much later.
Table 4. Tests on mean differences for technological indicators 
(total firms)
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.148
0.041
(i-3, i)
2.123
0.042
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-l, i+2)
1.781
0.079
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-2, i)
2.569
0.011
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.931
0.041
(i-3, i)
2.582
0.010
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i-l, i)
2.743
0.006
The analysis of the economic variables (Table 5) 
showed that productivity diminish significantly at the 
end of the project in CDTI companies, while in EU-
REKA companies a significant and positive difference 
was observed one year after completion of the project. 
This result is coherent with the findings of Benfratel-
lo and Sembenelli (2002), who also reported a posi-
tive association between participation in the EURE-
KA programme and labour productivity in a sample of 
750 European manufacturing companies in the period 
1992-1996. Meanwhile, significant differences were 
observed in returns on assets (ROA) in CDTI compa-
nies after completion of the project, which is consist-
ent with the findings reported by Bayona and García 
(2010) for a sample of 866 European companies in the 
period 1994-2003, although the positive influence on 
ROA was observed sooner (one year after the comple-
tion of the project).
Table 5. Tests on mean differences for economic indicators 
(total firms)
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+3)
5.334
0.000
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-l, i+1)
1.951
0.053
(i-l, i)
-2.195
0.028
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+1)
4.135
0.000
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-l, i+1)
1.730
0.084
-
-
-
 
Analysis by Company Size
Given the expected variability in the effects of the par-
ticipation of companies in these programmes due to 
the specific characteristics of individual firms, the same 
analysis was performed differentiating companies by 
size.
As shown in Table 6, the differences in R&D effort were 
significant, irrespective of either company size or the 
group to which the firms belonged. This finding was 
consistent with one of the main objectives of both pro-
grammes: the promotion of technological innovation. 
In the case of large firms, a significant difference was 
observed in the year of completion of the project with 
respect to the situation two years earlier. However, the 
situation in small and medium-sized firms differed ac-
cording to the type of programme: in companies partic-
ipating in the EUREKA programme the effect was not 
observed until one year later and the difference was 
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significant compared to the situation two years before 
the end of the project, whereas in companies partici-
pating in the CDTI projects a significant difference was 
observed in the year of completion of the programme.
Significant differences were observed in spending on 
the incorporation of ICT software in the year of pro-
ject completion in large companies participating in both 
types of projects and in small and medium-sized enter-
prises participating in CDTI projects. The non-paramet-
ric test showed also a significant difference in Eureka 
small and mediumsize firms the year of project comple-
tion. Finally, no significant differences were observed in 
terms of spending on patent applications.
Table 6. Test on mean differences for technological indicators 
(firms by size)
LARGE COMPANIES
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.688
0.028
(i, i+l)
3.077
0.008
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
1.891
0.078
(i-l, i)
1.774
0.086
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.073
0.038
(i, i+l)
2.947
0.003
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.327
0.020
(i-l, i)
2.001
0.045
SMEs
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
1.761
0.096
(i-3, i)
1.882
0.070
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-2, i)
2.146
0.035
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.286
0.022
(i-3, i)
2.252
0.024
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.915
0.004
(i-2, i)
3.283
0.001
The analysis of the economic variables (Table 7) re-
vealed significant differences in the eturns on assets 
(ROA) of large companies in both programmes. In the 
case of small and medium-sized firms, significant dif-
ferences were only observed in the companies par-
ticipating in CDTI projects after the completion of the 
project. The productivity variable had a positive impact 
in EUREKA and CDTI small and medium-sized com-
panies but a negative effect in CDTI large companies, 
according to the parametric test.
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Table 7. Tests on mean differences for economic indicators 
(firms by size)
LARGE COMPANIES
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i, i+1)
2.047
0.047
(i-2, i)
3.232
0.001
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-1, i+1)
-1.730
0.085
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i, i+2)
2.475
0.013
(i-2, i)
4.41
0.000
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i-1, i)
1.741
0.082
SMEs
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+3)
4.600
0.001
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-1, i+1)
2.124
0.036
(i-1, i)
0.303
0.032
 
 
 
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+1)
3.311
0.001
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-1, i+1)
1.862
0.063
(i-1, i)
3.160
0.002
Analysis by Sector
The analysis was also elaborated taking into account 
the three main economic sectors; a higher disaggre-
gation was not possible because in many cases the 
number of Eureka firms was too small when the dis-
aggregation is higher. The analysis differentiated by 
sector revealed no significant differences in terms of 
the technological impact in primary sector companies 
in either of the two groups (Table 8). In contrast, signif-
icant differences were observed in industrial compa-
nies belonging to both groups at the end of the project, 
in terms of both R&D effort and software expenditure, 
compared with the situation in previous years. Signif-
icant differences in spending on patent applications 
were only observed in CDTI companies three years 
after completion of the project.
Finally, no impact was observed in service sector 
EUREKA companies after their participation in the 
programme. Significant differences were observed, 
however, in R&D spending in CDTI companies two 
years after completion of the project compared with 
the efforts made during the years of project develop-
ment. Significant differences in the incorporation of 
ICT through spending on software were observed in 
the year of completion of the project, thus confirm-
ing previous findings reported in the general study. 
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Table 8. Tests on mean differences for technological indicators 
(firms by sector)
Primary sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
Industrial sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
3.52
0.003
(i-3, i)
2.102
0.045
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+3)
1.946
0.057
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.459
0.02
(i-2, i)
2.114
0.037
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.864
0.004
(i-3, i)
2.649
0.008
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i, i+3)
3.137
0.002
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.234
0.025
(i-2, i)
3.543
0
Service sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-1, i+2)
2.336
0.052
PAT/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
(i-2, i)
2.238
0.037
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
R&D/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
(i-1, i+2)
2.761
0.006
PAT/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
AI/AV Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i)
2.101
0.036
(i-2, i)
3.615
0
In terms of economic results (Table 9), significant dif-
ferences in the returns on assets (ROA) were observed 
sooner in the EUREKA companies than in the CDTI 
companies in all three sectors. In terms of labour pro-
ductivity, no impact was observed in primary sector 
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firms in either group, while EUREKA companies oper-
ating in the industrial and service sectors significant-
ly increased their productivity, in contrast to the CDTI 
companies whose productivity declined, according to 
the parametric test.
Table 9. Tests on mean differences for economic indicators 
(firms by sector)
Primary sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-1, i+1)
2.002
0.067
(i, i+3)
2.091
0.042
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2, i+1)
2.310
0.021
(i, i+3)
1.877
0.060
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
-
-
-
-
-
-
Industrial sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i+1, i)
1.824
0.003
(i, i+3)
4.148
0.000
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-1, i)
2.000
0.072
(i-2, i+1)
-3.790
0.000
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i, i+1)
2.485
0.013
(i, i+3)
5.206
0.000
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i, i+2)
1.7130.087
(i-2, i+1)
3.981
0.000
Service sector
Parametric Test ( t in differences for related samples)
EUREKA CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i, i+2)
2.262
0.027
(i, i+3)
3.206
0.001
PL Year of impact 
t Student
Sign
(i-2, i+2)
2.223
0.031
(i, i+1)
-2.305
0.022
Non-parametric Test (Wilcox test)
E U R E -
KA
CDTI
ROA Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i, i+2)
2.289
0.022
(i, i+3)
4.559
0.000
PL Year of impact 
z
Sign
(i-2,i+2)
2.158
0.031
(i, i+1)
4.721
0.000
5. Conclusions
Technological policy evaluation is a process of utmost 
importance in any economic context that aims to foster 
economic growth through technological progress and 
innovation. This paper seeks to provide information and 
feedback of the influence of innovation-focused pro-
grams in firm’s innovation and economic performance 
that allow the continuous improvement of any kind of 
initiative (private, governmental or even supranational).
The results shed light on the objectives sought by firms 
when applying for national (CDTI) or international (EU-
REKA) projects. While the former program offers com-
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panies financing support for shorter term R&D projects 
the latter offers a framework for their internationalisa-
tion and participation in strategic projects, especial-
ly advantageous for smaller firms. Additionally, CDTI 
projects favour shorter decision making on project ap-
proval and therefore the results will be attained in a 
shorter term including the achievement of productivi-
ty gains (as pointed out by Busom, 2000, and Huergo 
and Trenado, 2008). On the other hand, EUREKA in-
volves longer negotiations and decision making. Their 
results will be attained at longer term and will include 
enhanced returns on investments. This program facil-
itates participant firms’ coexistence with international 
environments where industrial property protection is a 
standard project result and therefore the higher patent 
impact of this program. These results confirm previous 
research (Cimolli et al, 2006).
The statistical analysis allowed to compare the results 
obtained by the companies before and after their par-
ticipation in the corresponding programme to promote 
technological innovation, using two types of variables: 
economic and technological. The technological results 
of companies tended to improve, as evidenced in par-
ticular by a clear increase in R&D effort as a result of 
their participation in the programmes, although the im-
pacts were observed sooner in the EUREKA compa-
nies than in the CDTI companies and mainly in industri-
al sector. The more intensive introduction of information 
technology through spending on software differed sig-
nificantly in larger industrial companies participating in 
both types of projects. However, spending on patent 
applications only differed significantly in CDTI industrial 
companies in which impacts were observed three years 
after completion of the project. These results could 
be interpreted by the difference in project monitoring 
in both programs. While a CDTI project doesn’t have 
continuous monitoring except two or three milestone 
reviews by CDTI officers, EUREKA partners meet in a 
continuous basis to discuss project progress and are 
subjected to the influence of their partner’s achieve-
ments throughout the project duration.
As regards the economic effects, the results were less 
conclusive since some differences were observed de-
pending on the programme. The EUREKA companies 
displayed better behaviour, with positive differences in 
their returns on assets when each sector was analysed 
separately, and labour productivity also increased in 
most companies. However, results in the CDTI com-
panies were less clear because although differences in 
their returns on assets were positive three years after 
their participation in the programme, their labour pro-
ductivity showed a clearly negative trend following the 
paradox proposed by Lang (2009). This could be inter-
preted as a synergic effect of the international partner-
ships established within the project participants con-
firming previous findings by researchers (Bayona-Sáez 
and García-Marco, 2010; Benfratello and Sembenelli, 
2002). Furthermore, it could be concluded that both 
programs fulfil the principles of the additionality school 
(Arvanitis et al, 2002; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 
2003; Duguet, 2004; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Aerts and 
Schmidt, 2008; González and Pazo, 2010).
Finally, as far as the differences in economic and 
technological results are concerned, findings are very 
promising although further effort is required. Here the 
type of project and its technological risk will play a rele-
vant role as it has been pointed out by various authors 
(Georghiou, 1997; Klette et al, 2000; Nelson, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the results confirm the importance of de-
signing more detailed and rigorous evaluation process-
es in order to draw a more realistic picture of the impact 
of national and international programmes for Spanish 
firms.
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